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Abstract 
We study intraday jumps on a pure limit order FX market by linking them to news 
announcements and liquidity shocks. First, we show that jumps are frequent and contribute 
greatly to the return volatility. Nearly half of the jumps can be linked with scheduled and 
unscheduled news announcements. Furthermore, we show that jumps are information based, 
whether they are linked with news announcements or not. Prior to jumps, liquidity does not 
deviate from its normal level, nor do liquidity shocks offer any predictive power for jump 
occurrence. Jumps emerge not as a result of unusually low liquidity but rather as a result of an 
unusually high demand for immediacy concentrated on one side of the book. During and after 
the jump, a dynamic order placement process emerges: some participants endogenously 
become liquidity providers and absorb the increased demand for immediacy. We detect an 
interesting asymmetry and find the liquidity providers to be more reluctant to add liquidity 
when confronted with a news announcement around the jump. Further evidence shows that 
participants submit more limit orders relative to market orders after a jump. Consequently, the 
informational role of order flow becomes less pronounced in the thick order book after the 
jump. 
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1. Introduction 
Jumps, which are significant discontinuities in asset prices, have been an important topic in 
financial research over the last few decades.  Empirical research shows that jumps in financial 
time series are common and contribute greatly to asset volatility. As an integral part of the 
underlying price process, they pose extreme price risk for traders and they are of vital 
importance for risk management purposes.  
Our study investigates intraday jumps on the exchange market and their relation to 
macroeconomic news releases and the liquidity dynamics of the limit order book. We study 
the interbank HUF/ EUR exchange market over a two-year sample period (2003 and 2004). 
First, we detect jumps and document their prevalence and size on an emerging foreign 
exchange market, which is characterized by relatively low trading volumes. In previous 
research, jumps have been related with macroeconomic news of various sorts. We investigate 
to what extent this is actually the case. Besides scheduled macroeconomic announcements, we 
also incorporate real-time, unscheduled announcements in our dataset. Furthermore, it has 
been put forward by Lahaye et al. (2011) that jumps which cannot be related to news 
announcements can be caused by insufficient market liquidity.  
However, the concept of liquidity is elusive as it has multiple dimensions (Amihud 2002; 
Pástor & Stambaugh 2003; Acharya & Pedersen 2005). For example, Liu (2006) defines 
liquidity as the ability to trade large quantities quickly at low cost and with little price impact. 
Four dimensions, namely trading quantity (depth), trading speed (immediacy), trading cost 
(tightness), and price impact (resiliency) emerges from this definition. As one of our motives 
is to pin down the cause of the jump, we map the different dimensions of liquidity that can be 
observed in the limit order book, and investigate whether there is any systematic pattern prior 
to the jump. We find that the jump itself influences the behavior of market participants, and 
we shed a new light on how traders formalize their “make or take” decision during and after a 
jump. We link our work with empirical regularities regarding traders’ order placement 
strategy, and investigate to what extent they still hold under extreme market conditions.   
By definition, jumps are latent as they are an integral part of the price process, which makes 
them difficult to estimate. In their seminal work, Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004) 
show that under maintained conditions the quadratic variation process could be decomposed 
into an integrated variation component and a jump component. Moreover, they provide two 
non-parametric measures of volatility designed for the discrete nature of empirical high-
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frequency data: realized variance and realized bipower variation. The former measures the 
quadratic variation while the latter measures the integrated variation. The difference between 
the two provides a consistent estimate of the jump component under maintained conditions. In 
their later work, Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006b) propose several finite sample jump 
detection statistics based on asymptotic distribution theory. Huang and Tauchen (2005) 
further provide extensive simulation evidence in support of the finite sample properties of 
these jump test statistics. The jump detection method has been applied in empirical researches 
of various settings. For example, Andersen et al. (2007a) confirm the existence of jumps in 
FX, equity and treasury markets and make important progress in the forecasting realized 
volatility by separating the jump component from its continuous sample path counterpart. 
Beine et al. (2007) find that coordinated interventions by central banks in FX markets cause 
fewer but more pronounced jumps after accounting for the announcement effect.  
More recently, various attempts have been made to modify the jump identification method, so 
that it can pin down the exact timing of the jump at the intraday level. Andersen et al. (2007b) 
and Andersen et al. (2010) present a recursive jump detection method for identifying intraday 
jumps, thereby providing superior information on jumps. Alternative methods to detect 
intraday jumps have also been presented by Lee and Mykland (2008), Jiang et al. (2011) and 
Boudt and Petitjean (201x) among others.  
The advances made in jump detection methods enjoy a burst of recent analysis on the link 
between macroeconomic fundamentals (news) and jumps on various financial markets.  
Huang (2007) confirms that jumps occur more frequently on news-days than on non-news 
days in US futures market. Focusing on US treasury market, Dungey et al. (2009) find that the 
majority of cojumps are associated with scheduled news releases, which is later confirmed by 
Jiang et al. (2011). Placing more emphasis on the general regularity of jump dynamics across 
different asset markets (US stock, Treasury and USD/EUR market), Evans (2011) documents 
that around one-third of the intraday jumps occur immediately after the release of news and 
that the informational shocks explain large proportions of the jump magnitude. In their 
seminal work, Lahaye et al. (2011) analyze the difference in size, frequency and timing of 
jumps across three US stock index futures, one treasury bond futures and four major currency 
pairs, and further link these dynamics to their likely sources (such as informational shocks). 
Several stylized facts emerge from their work: First, foreign exchange markets experience 
significantly more jumps while the average jump magnitude is smaller compared to other 
asset markets. Second, the link between macroeconomic news and jumps is weaker in foreign 
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exchange markets than in other asset markets, which Lahaye et al. (2011) attribute to the 
restricted news dataset and other possible sources of jumps such as idiosyncratic liquidity 
shocks commonly observed in the currency markets during the slow trading process.   
Related high frequency studies have also examined the relation between liquidity dynamics of 
the market and jumps. Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2011) find that trading volume, as a rough 
gauge of market liquidity, explains independently a small portion of jumps in the US stock 
market, as trading volume reaches its highest value during the 5 minute interval prior to the 
jump. Using a probit model, Jiang et al. (2011) confirm that lagged liquidity shocks are able 
to predict the occurrence of jumps after accounting for the effect of informational shocks. 
Using an event study approach, Boudt and Petitjean (201x) document that jumps are largely 
driven by a sharp rise in the demand for immediacy, as the number of trades increases 
dramatically prior to jumps, while market depth at the best price does not decay as commonly 
expected. To sum up, potential economic sources of jumps in financial markets include 
scheduled macroeconomic news, unscheduled news releases, and market liquidity shocks. 
An independent strand in the microstructure literature has focused on investors’ order 
submission strategies in limit order book markets: the classical “make or take” decisions (see 
Bloomfield et al. 2005, among others). On the theory side, Cohen et al. (1981), Glosten 
(1994), Seppi (1997), Harris (1998), Parlour (1998), Foucault (1999), Sandås (2001), 
Hollifield et al. (2004), Foucault et al. (2005) and Roşu (2009) develop liquidity-based 
models of limit-order book. The main predictions of these models include that (1) the 
proportion of limit orders relative to market orders increases subsequent to a rise in asset 
volatility, (2) the proportion of limit orders relative to market orders increases subsequent to 
the widening of spreads, and (3) own side depth encourages the submission of market orders. 
On the empirical side, Biais et al. (1995), Griffiths et al. (2000), Ahn et al. (2001), Ranaldo 
(2004) and Cao et al. (2008) have provided consistent evidence with these predictions. More 
recently, experimental and empirical studies based on information-based models of the limit 
order book uniformly suggest that informed traders tend to use, under certain conditions, limit 
orders at the side where liquidity is needed (see Bloomfield et al. 2005; Kaniel & Liu 2006 , 
among others). Bloomfield et al. (2005) posit that, under certain conditions, informed traders 
change their order aggressiveness over the trading period by submitting limit orders at the 
side where liquidity is scarce as they are less subject to adverse selection costs.  
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Jumps are sudden price spikes that pose significant price risk to investors. Obviously, it is 
interesting to examine traders’ “make or take” decisions under these extreme market 
conditions. Moreover, it is of great interest to test whether the predictions regarding traders’ 
order placement strategy still hold conditioning on the occurrence of jumps with and without 
macroeconomic news. In spite of the relevance of the topic, there are few empirical works that 
investigate the order placement strategies around intraday jumps.  
Our article contributes to the empirical studies on jumps in at least three ways: 
 First, we apply an established jump identification method to a small and less liquid exchange 
rate market in contrast to existing work which focuses on the most liquid major currency pairs 
such as USD/EUR and USD/GBP. Our aim is to examine to which extent the jump dynamics 
exhibited in these major currencies could be generalized to the other currencies, in particular 
the Hungarian Forint. One could expect jumps would be more prevalent in the HUF/EUR 
market than in major exchange rate markets due to its illiquidity, less market capitalization or 
even its distinctive trading characteristics as examined in Frömmel et al. (2011). Our results 
confirm that jumps are large and prevalent  in a relatively illiquid market such as HUF/EUR 
market.  Around 18.2% of our sample days are identified as containing at least one intraday 
jump with the jump component contributing nearly one-half of the realized volatility during 
these jump days.  
Secondly, we extend the announcement effect literature by investigating the link between 
jumps and news releases of various sorts. Our enlarged news dataset covers not only the 
scheduled macroeconomic news announcements, but also the unscheduled news 
announcements which will change investors’ expectation on future fundamentals.  The 
enlarged news dataset also enables us to (informally) compare the relative importance of 
different news categories. Our results suggest that both scheduled and unscheduled news are 
related to jumps with the unscheduled news such as polls, surveys, forecasts and analysis on 
(future) fundamentals producing the most of the jumps (30.4%). 
Thirdly, to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to bridge the gap between jump-
related literature and the order placement literature. Using event study methodology,  we 
zoom in on the dynamics of various liquidity dimensions around jumps, providing a 
comprehensive picture on how the limit order book looks like before, during and after the 
jump. Furthermore, we test whether the predictions from limit order book models for order 
placement still hold under these extreme market conditions. We find only a very weak, if any, 
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pattern in liquidity prior to jumps after controlling for the announcement effect. Consistent 
with Boudt and Petitjean (201x), we find that jumps do not emerge as a result of unusually 
low liquidity, but as a result of an unusually high demand for immediacy concentrated on one 
side of the limit order book, implying increased information asymmetry across traders during 
the jump period. Moreover, more limit orders are added to the ask (bid) side subsequent to a 
positive (negative) jump, confirming the existence of discretionary liquidity providers who 
supply liquidity at the side where it is needed the most. We also observe an interesting 
asymmetry in post-jump resiliency, which is clearly higher for negative jumps than for 
positive jumps. Finally, we perform an additional regression-type analysis to show that post-
jump transaction order flow is less informative, as more limit orders relative to market orders 
are submitted to the order book subsequent to jumps. Overall, our results confirm the 
predictions from limit order book models: the submission of limit orders is encouraged by the 
widening of  the spread and increased volatility caused by a  jump. 
To presage our results, the rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes a pure 
order-driven FX market in general and our unique dataset in particular. Section 3 explains our 
theoretical framework regarding the jump detection method. Section 4 presents our empirical 
findings regarding the jump dynamics and the announcement effect. Section 5 presents our 
event-study results on the liquidity dynamics around jumps. Section 6 provides further 
evidence on pre-jump and post-jump liquidity patterns. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Data  
The foreign exchange market 
The foreign exchange market is a two-tier market. Trades on the foreign exchange market can 
be divided into customer trades, i.e. trades between a bank and customers (the ultimate end-
users, for instance importing and exporting firms, mutual or hedge funds, governments and 
central banks) and interbank trades. In this work we focus on the interbank market, to which 
customers do not have access. It is here that the price formation takes place. The market is a 
pure order-driven market, without designated market maker. Participants can submit orders 
24h a day. The majority of trades on this market are nowadays done via electronic broking 
systems. Since their introduction in 1992 their share in total transaction volume has steadily 
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increased, depending on the country, from 4 to 6 per cent in 1995 to more than 55% of the 
interbank market in 2010 (BIS 1996, 2010).
1
 
There are two main platforms competing in the foreign exchange market: Reuters D3000 and 
EBS (Electronic Broking System). In our analysis we rely on the Reuters D3000 system. As 
an electronic limit order book it contains buy and sell orders in a price-time priority. Euro sale 
and purchase offers are placed at limit prices. Besides these limit orders, consisting of the 
maximum respectively minimum price and the quantity offered to be traded, it is also possible 
to place a market order, i.e., an order without a specified price. They are immediately matched 
with the best corresponding limit order and thus more aggressive. While limit orders add 
liquidity to the limit order book, market orders take liquidity from the book. The following 
matches may lead to a trade: two limit orders that are matched up by the system, or a market 
order that is matched up with the best limit order on the opposite side.  
The HUF/EUR market 
Our dataset consists of all quotes, i.e., limit and market orders, on the HUF/EUR interbank 
market that have been placed during the years 2003 and 2004 via the Reuters D3000 broking 
system. Because at this time the competing system EBS did not offer services for the 
HUF/EUR market, the dataset covers the complete trading on electronic brokerage platforms, 
and thus the major part of  the total market activity (which would also include OTC trades). 
The HUF trade accounted during or sample period for only 0.22% of the global turnover on 
the FX market (BIS 2005). This dataset was also described in Gereben and Kiss M. (2006). 
The reconstruction of the limit order book 
We observe the price, the quantity in Euro that was offered or asked, whether it was a market 
or a limit order and the exact time when the order was placed and when it disappeared. We 
observe whether the order was withdrawn or whether it was executed, i.e., matched with 
another limit or market order. We do not observe the identity of the traders.Our analysis 
requires information on the state of the limit order book at the intraday level. We therefore 
reconstruct the order book, and update it whenever a new event occurs (limit order 
submission, market order submission, limit order cancellation). When a new limit order is 
submitted, the order book is (re-)calculated by adding all activated limit orders to the relevant 
                                                          
1
 The share of electronic trading in interbank trading is by some authors even estimated at 85% of the total 
interbank activity (Sager & Taylor 2006). 
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side of the book.
2
 When a new market order is submitted, it is verified whether the activated 
orders that leave the book upon submission of the order cover the market order. If not, the 
liquidity available for the activated limit orders at the opposite side of the book is adapted. A 
marketable limit order is treated in the same way as a market order, but if it has not been filled 
completely it will stay in the book with a reduced volume.
 3
 Cancelation of existing limit 
orders is also taken into account. It is verified whether orders leave the book before the next 
order is submitted to the trading platform. Each time this happens, a new event is identified 
and added to the time series of limit order book states. The event time will here be the 
removal time of the order. To obtain the new order book state the post-event orders are sorted 
according to price and time priority. 
The output of the limit order book reconstruction process is a series of observations in event-
time, with for each event a timestamp at 10 ms. precision and all orders at the bid and ask side 
(with their respective quotes, quantities, record numbers, entering and removal times). For 
very short periods zero or negative spreads can be observed. Their presence can be explained 
by the absence of clearing agreements between certain banks (in this case, the two banks who 
have posted the best orders at the respective sides of the book do not have such an 
agreement). As other banks, which do have clearing agreements with the issuers of the best 
orders from both sides, can take advantage of this situation, these zero or negative spreads are 
short-lived.  
Legally recognized holidays in Hungary and weekends are left out.
4  
Figure 1 shows 
graphically the evolution of the HUF/EUR quote and the volume traded via the electronic 
limit order book. Furthermore, we only use data from 7am till 7pm CET. Figure 2 shows the 
bimodal intraday distribution of ticks (with ,for example, the quantity of ticks displayed at 5 
containing all ticks between 5am till 6am). After the time filter, we still cover almost the 
complete market activity. Table 1 shows key characteristics of the orders submitted to the 
market over the sample period, split up per half-year. The type of orders is shown to be very 
stable over time: 15-16% of the orders are market orders, 54-60% of the orders are limit 
orders which are cancelled without execution and 25-30% of the orders are limit orders which 
                                                          
2
 Activated orders are the orders which have been entered before the event time, and which have not left the 
book at the event time. Activated orders should not be confused with active orders (i.e. orders which initiate a 
trade). 
3
 A marketable limit order is a limit order that can be immediately executed, because its price or equal to or 
better than the best quote from the opposite side of the book. 
4
 For 2003 these were: 1/01, 15/03, 21/04, 1/05, 9/06, 20/08, 23/10, 1/11, 25/12 and 26/12. For 2004 these were: 
1/01, 15/03, 12/04, 1/05, 31/05, 20/08, 23/10, 1/11, 25/12 and 26/12. 
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are partly matched with market orders or with marketable limit orders. Major part (71-79%) 
of the orders have a size of 1 mill., which is the minimum size. Table 2 presents basic 
descriptives of the limit order book. The quoted spread increases in the second half of 2003 
(from 0.31 to 0.39 HUF/EUR), but decreases in 2004 (till 0.24 HUF/EUR). The average 
breadth (the quantity available at the best quote) is, interestingly, always bigger on the buy 
side. The same accounts for the average depth over the whole order book. In the second half 
of 2003 and the second half of 2004 we observe a sudden and large increase in depth at the 
buy side. This unusually high depth is caused by positive outliers: in the periods 24/9/2003-
9/10/2003 and 10/11/2004-31/12/2004 there are unusually high orders added to the buy side 
(however, away from the best quote). The number of price levels at the buy side is on average 
6-7, at the ask side there seems to be a slight increase in the average number of levels (from 
5.64 in the first half of 2003 till 7.35 in the second half of 2004). 
The advantage of our dataset for the analysis of jumps and their link with liquidity is 
threefold. First, on the foreign exchange market orders can be submitted on a continuous 
basis. There are, in contrast to for example equity markets, no opening or closing sessions that 
can affect the data. As the observed price and liquidity can never be driven by these artificial 
operations, the dynamics between announcements and liquidity should become clear more 
easily. Secondly, we are able to observe the complete liquidity as there are no orders which 
display only part of their total volume (iceberg orders). By consequence we have a clear view 
on the supply and demand on the market. Thirdly, we cover the lion’s share of the market 
activity on the HUF/EUR market (most of  the trading activity on the HUF/EUR market takes 
place via electronic limit order books, and we completely cover this form of trading). 
Compared to other studies, our dataset is unusually rich. This is to our knowledge the only 
study in which a complete tick-by-tick database and a full order book over a timespan as long 
as two years is used for the foreign exchange market. Still, we have to keep in mind that the 
data, although covering our market to a very large extent, can display different trading 
characteristics then other, major foreign exchange markets. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Jump Detection 
Realized variance and Bipower variation 
We assume that the log-price p(t) of the underlying asset follows a continuous-time jump-
diffusion process (i.e. a Brownian semimartingale with finite jump process), as is traditionally 
used in asset pricing (Andersen et al. 2007b; Lee & Mykland 2008; Evans 2011):  
  ( )   ( )    ( )  ( )   ( )  ( ) [3.1] 
where μ(t) is the continuous and bounded drift term, σ(t) a strictly positive stochastic volatility 
process with a sample path that is right continuous and has well defined limits, W(t) a 
standard Brownian motion, q(t) is a counting process with possible time-varying intensity λ(t) 
(which implies P[dp(t) = 1]= λ(t) dt), and k(t) ≡ p(t) - p(t-) is the size of the corresponding 
discontinuous jump in the underlying log-price movement, provided the jump exists.  
Given the above theoretical setup, the quadratic variation (QV) for the cumulative return 
process over a fixed time interval T, consists of both, the continuous volatility component and 
the contribution of jumps to volatility. It is defined as:  
[   ]  ∫  
 ( )   ∑   ( )
     
 
 
 [3.2] 
According to Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004),  a non-parametric measure of the daily 
return variation, realized variance (RV), is defined as the summation of the M high frequency 
intra-daily squared returns within day i:  
    ∑    
 
 
   
 [3.3] 
where rij is the return in the interval j out of M intervals on day i.
5
 Based on the theory of 
quadratic variation (Barndorff-Nielsen & Shephard 2004, 2006a), realized variance converges 
to its probability limit, the increment of the quadratic variation process as the sampling 
frequency M tends to infinity: 
                                                          
5
 We refer to ri as the return on day i, and to rij as the return in interval j on day i. Therefore daily and intradaily 
returns are linked by  

M
j jii rr 1 ,  , with a total of M subintervals for each day. 
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    ∫  
 ( )   ∑   ( )
       
 
   
 [3.4] 
Therefore, the realized variance is a consistent estimator of the total return variation 
regardless of the existence of within-day jumps.  
To decompose the continuous sample path component from the QV process, Barndorff-
Nielsen and Shephard (2006a) introduce the scaled realized bipower variation (BPV), defined 
as the summation of the product of adjacent absolute high frequency returns standardized by a 
constant: 
       
  ∑               
 
   
 [3.5] 
where   =  (   )  √    and )1,0(~ Nu . Under some further assumptions
6
 regarding the 
underlying log-price dynamics in equation [3.1], the (scaled) realized bipower variation 
converges uniformly in probability to the integrated volatility as M tends to infinity (for a 
proof see Theorem 2 in Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004)): 
     ∫  
 ( )  
 
   
 [3.6] 
Therefore, the difference between the realized variance and the (scaled) realized bipower 
varition provides a consistent estimation of the pure jump contribution to the quadratic 
variation process within the day, as M tends to infinity: 
         ∑  
 ( )
       
 [3.7] 
Based on the relation between realized variance and bipower variation it is then possible to 
construct tests for the occurrence of jumps, see Huang and Tauchen (2005) for a survey. We 
rely on the ratio test statistics (Z) to identify statistically significant jumps (See Huang and 
Tauchen 2005): 
                                                          
6
 As is further demonstrated in Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006a), the only additional assumption required 
is that the stochastic volatility σ(t) is independent of the standardized Brownian motion W(t) in equation [3.1] 
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[        ]   
  
[(  
      
    )     {          
  }]
 
 
  (   ) [3.8] 
with the tripower quarticity (TQ) defined as   
        ⁄
  ∑      
 
          
 
          
 
 
 
   
 [3.9] 
Where    ⁄   (   
 
 )   
 
  (
 
 
)  (
 
 
)⁄        . Under maintained assumptions, equation 
[3.8] implies that the ratio statistic follows standard normal distribution. Following the 
literature we set the significant level to α = 0.0001 and therefore the critical value is     
     .  
Microstructure noise and jump measurements 
In practice, the assumed regularity of the log-price movement is contaminated by market 
microstructure frictions such as discrete price tick, bid-ask spread bounce and etc. On the one 
hand, the existence of microstructure noise in the underlying log-price process renders 
realized variance an inconsistent estimator of its probability limit (the quadratic variation) 
(Andersen et al. 2007b). On the other hand, both the realized bipower variation and tripower 
quarticity are biased against the finding of significant jumps due to the noise-induced first-
order autocorrelation revealed in the high frequency return series. To alleviate the adverse 
effect of microstructure noise on jump detection scheme, we tackle the problem in two ways: 
First, we choose a ten-minute sampling frequency at which the microstructure frictions no 
longer present a distorting influence on realized variance (Andersen et al. 2010)
7
. Second, we 
modify the calculation of realized bipower variation and tripower quarticity by replacing the 
adjacent absolute returns in equation [3.5] and [3.9] with their staggered counterparts to break 
up the spurious autocorrelation pattern observed in the high frequency return series (similar to  
Andersen et al. (2007a); Beine et al. (2007); Evans (2011); among others): 
       
  (
 
   
)∑               
 
   
 [3.10] 
                                                          
7
 The volatility signature plots in Andersen et al. (2010) suggests that there’s a systematic declining pattern in 
the realized variance measure as the sampling frequency increases in the range of 5 to 300 seconds, which 
destabilizes our measurement of RV (and hence the difference between RV and BPV), therefore, a 10-minute 
sampling scheme seems an appropriate, albeit somewhat conservative, method to control microstructure noise.  
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        ⁄
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)∑      
 
  |      |
 
          
 
 
 
   
 [3.11] 
The staggered version of realized bipower variation and tripower quarticity is then used in 
equation [3.8] to compute the new ratio test statistic for jump detection. Huang and Tauchen 
(2005) show that the ratio Z-statistic with staggering offers improved size and power 
properties in finite sample simulation and is quite robust to the size of microstructure noise.  
Since the test statistic only indicates the days when at least one significant jump occurred, but 
neither the exact time nor the number of jumps, we apply the sequential intraday jump 
detection scheme proposed by Andersen et al. (2010)
8
 to identify all the intraday jumps.  
 
3.2. Event study methodology 
In this section, we investigate the intraday liquidity dynamics around jumps using the intraday 
event study methodology (see Boudt & Petitjean 201x; Gomber et al. 2013; Mazza 2013 , for 
similar application). We employ a variety of liquidity measures commonly used in the 
empirical literature to capture the different dimensions of the market liquidity (eg. Boudt & 
Petitjean 201x; Mazza 2013). Appendix I gives a full-fledged definition of all the liquidity 
measures used in the study. 
The event study approach proceeds as follows: First, we construct a centered jump event 
window which includes the six 10-minute intervals before and after the jump event. Second, 
we exclude intraday jumps which are clustered in time in order to avoid contagion effect. That 
is, when two jumps occur within the same day, they must be separated in time by at least two 
hours. Otherwise, both of the jumps are excluded from our sample. For similar concerns, days 
with three or more jumps are also excluded from the final sample. Third, all liquidity 
measures are standardized to make them comparable across days and intraday periods. Given 
the fact that liquidity measures are highly skewed at the intraday level and have strong 
seasonal patterns, we opt for the novel standardization procedure highlighted in Boudt and 
Petitjean (201x). Appendix II provides a detailed description on the standardization 
procedure. Fourth, we aggregate across individual jump events for a single point estimate. We 
                                                          
8
  Jiang and Oomen (2008) and Jiang et al. (2011) employ similar sequential jump identification scheme with the 
slight difference that they use the median of the remaining intraday returns to calculate the revised ratio 
statistics.  
14 
 
favor the median value, rather than the mean value, of the standardized liquidity measure 
across individual events as our point estimator. The rationale behind our preference is well-
grounded. First, liquidity measures such as number of trades, trading volume, and depth (per 
ten minutes) have a lower bound of zero, while in theory they do not have an upper bound. 
Therefore, the distribution of their standardized value remains highly skewed, which is also 
confirmed in our sample. Second, as argued by Boudt et al. (2011), the median of the 
standardized liquidity measures on non-jump days will be 1 for depth and volume measures 
and 0 for order and depth imbalance measures by construction. In that case, the interpretation 
of the median of the standardized liquidity measure is quite straightforward: It shows the 
(percentage) deviation from the typical levels during the same time of the day. Fifth, a 
Wilcoxon rank sum test on the median is performed to evaluate the null hypothesis that price 
jumps do not have any effect on liquidity. In order words, liquidity measures tend to stay at 
their normal level around jumps (median value of the standardized liquidity measures is zero). 
The alternative hypothesis is that liquidity measures are either abnormally lower or higher 
than their normal level around jumps. 
It is important to mention that we explicitly distinguish between positive jumps events and 
negative jumps events, as positive jumps are mostly linked with large market buy orders 
combined with the paucity of liquidity at the ask side while negative jumps are linked with 
large market sell orders combined with the paucity at the bid side. In other words, we expect 
the liquidity dynamics around positive jumps and negative jumps will mirror each other. 
Therefore, our final event study samples are distinguished between positive jump events and 
negative jump events. For each category, we further divide them into positive (negative) 
jumps events associated with news announcements and positive (negative) jumps events 
without news announcements.  
 
4. Jumps and news announcements  
Prevalence and size of jumps 
In this subsection, we investigate the jump intensity and magnitude for the HUF/EUR rates, 
which is a relatively illiquid market compared to major currencies such as USD/EUR. The 
results are summarized in Table 3. We detect 90 realized jump days with at least one intraday 
jump. There are 125 intraday jumps in total (see Table 4). The jump intensity—defined as the 
ratio of realized jump days to total trading days—is 18.2% for our sample period, which is 
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quite similar to the jump frequency found in prior literature on the major currency markets: 
Beine et al. (2007) report a jump intensity of 10%–13% for the USD/EUR and JPY/USD 
markets between 1987 and 2004. Andersen et al. (2007a) document a 14% jump frequency 
for the DEM/ USD rates between 1986 and 1999. Lahaye et al. (2011) report that the jump 
frequency lies within the range of 22%–25% for the USD/EUR, USD/GBP, USD/JPY and 
USD/CHF markets between 1987 and 2004. We further find that the average jump duration—
defined as the mean time length (measured in days) between two neighbouring jump days—is 
6.6 days for our sample. We also calculate to what extent the jump component contributes to 
the realized variance on realized jump days. On average, 42.59% of the price variation on 
jump days can be attributed to jumps. This is also in line with previous work on major 
currencies. For example, Evans (2011) report a jump contribution of 35.80% on the the USD/ 
EUR market.  
When comparing positive and negative jumps (see Table 4), we find that the differences both 
in terms of frequency and magnitude are small and not statistically significant. Therefore, we 
can conclude that jumps are symmetric in terms of both frequency and size. This is consistent 
with previous research on major currency markets (Lahaye et al. 2011). 
We find that intraday jumps are concentrated on two periods, one in the morning (between 
8:00 and 8:20 (CET)) and one in the afternoon (between 15:50 and 16:50 (CET)). We see that 
66.67% of the jumps takes place during these timespans.  
Jumps and public news announcements
9
 
By theory, price tends to jump to the new equilibrium level immediately after new 
information (shocks) has been revealed to the market. Therefore, one obvious source of jumps 
is prescheduled macroeconomic news. These announcements represent potential shocks to the 
market if the statistics released do not match the market expectations.
10
 Previous research in 
this field suggests that nonfarm payroll, central bank announcements, and trade balance 
shocks are the major news items that are most closely linked with foreign exchange jumps 
(Neely 2011). In this work, we also adopt a variety of macro news items such as the releases 
of GDP, PPI and trade balance information in Hungary and the European Union. To account 
for possible cross-currency pressure such as cojumps and global liquidity shocks (see Banti et 
                                                          
9
 The data on news announcements is collected from the very comprehensive Dow Jones Factiva News database, 
which contains data from newswires such as Reuters and Dow Jones. 
10
 Unfortunately, we cannot observe the surprise component of the announcement. 
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al. 2012), we also include the macroeconomic announcements from the United States, leading 
EU countries such as Germany and France, and neighbouring CEEC countries such as 
Poland.
11
Following Lahaye et al. (2011), we attribute the jump occurrence to a news event 
using a 60-minute matching window centered around the jump. That is, if  a news event takes 
place between the 30 minutes before and 30 minutes after the jump, we assume that the jump 
is directly linked with it. Table 5 summarizes our findings. We can link 16% of the detected 
jumps with scheduled news announcements. The conditional probability of observing a jump 
given a particular sort of news item is the highest for GDP releases for Hungary (25%), 
followed by inflation releases for Germany (8.33%) and inflation releases for Poland (8.33%). 
Given a jump, there is no clear pattern as which type of news has a high probability of having 
caused the jump (not a single type of news has a higher conditional probability than 1.60%). 
In addition to linking jumps with prescheduled macroeconomic announcements, we also 
investigate the potential link with unscheduled, real-time news announcements that can 
potentially influence the HUF/ EUR quote. As this news influences the expectations on 
fundamentals, it can, according to standard models of exchange rate determination, influence 
the quote directly (Evans & Lyons 2005). We include central bank interventions, polls, 
surveys, forecasts, analyses by financial institutions and leading economists, political changes 
and natural disasters, following Copeland (2005). Table 6 presents our results in detail. We 
can link a significant part of the jumps (30.4%) with unscheduled news announcements. 
Amongst the 15 largest jumps, 4 jumps can be explained by this type of news (as much as the 
number of jumps that can be explained by scheduled macroeconomic news announcements). 
Overall, our results show that unscheduled, real-time news is another important source of 
jumps. Still, nearly half of the jumps remain unexplained, which is possibly due to the 
prevalence of private information in the FX market. Informed traders capitalize on their 
private information by taking up the liquidity of the order book, forcing the price to jump to a 
new level. Section 5 and 6 provide more in-depth evidence on our conjectures of informed 
trading by examing the liquidity dynamics around the jump.  
 
 
                                                          
11
 The motivation for incorporating macroeconomic announcements for other economies is double. First, market 
participants form their expectations on macroeconomic statistics for the European Union based on the release of 
national statistics, which takes place earlier than the release of the aggregated statistics. Secondly, recent 
empirical evidence on cojumps on foreign exchange markets showed that fundamental shocks to one currency 
pair can put substantial risk on linked markets (Lahaye et al. 2011; Neely 2011). 
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5.  Jumps and liquidity dynamics 
In addition to investigating the link between public news and jumps, a proper understanding 
of jumps and where they come from requires an in-depth analysis of the interaction that takes 
place in the book around jumps. Conventional wisdom suggests that a jump reflects the 
inability of the limit order book to absorb relatively large market orders quickly. Therefore, 
large market orders have to walk up or down the book for execution. However, this 
mechanical view neglects the role of limit order flows when a jump occurs. In fact, the limit 
order book is a platform where interaction, among informed traders, market makers (liquidity 
providers) and noise traders, takes place via market and limit orders. The sudden increase of 
volatility impacts the liquidity of the market as traders (dynamically) revise their order 
placement strategy (such as order aggressiveness and order size). Therefore, built on 
theoretical models of the limit order book developed in previous research (Glosten 1994; 
Foucault 1999), we further develop hypotheses on the dynamic relation between price jumps 
and the different dimensions of liquidity.
12
  
In this section we describe the liquidity dynamics prior to, during and after jumps, 
incorporating both the mechanical and dynamical view (as they both can matter). The findings 
in this section shed a new light on what the cause is of jumps, whether there is a stylized 
liquidity pattern that preceeds jumps and how the jump affects the interaction that takes place. 
We apply here the event study approach (cf. supra). For clarification purpose, we present here 
mainly the liquidity dynamics around positive jumps as the liquidity dynamics around 
positive jumps and negative jumps mirror each other.
13
 The detailed results can be found in 
Table 7 (positive jumps) and Table 8 (negative jumps). Figure 5 till Figure 13 present boxplots 
for various indicators on the state of the limit order book (and this for each 10 minute interval 
from 1 hour prior to the jump till 1 hour after the jump). The central mark is the median, and 
the edges of the box are the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles. The whiskers point at the most extreme 
observation which is still no outlier.
14
 
 
                                                          
12
 Here we use a broader definition of news, which includes now also private news such as the customer order 
flow observed by the market participant. The assumption that jumps are information-based is supported by the 
fact that we observe an increased imbalance of the order flow during jumps, which is a common proxy for 
information. Additional evidence can be found in the price reversal pattern after the jump (See Figure 4)  
13
 And where this is not the case, we mention it explicitly. 
14
 Observations are considered to be outliers if they are larger than q3 + 1.5*(q3-q1) or smaller than q1-1.5*(q3-q1) 
with q1 is the 25
th
 percentile and q3 is the 75
th
 percentile. 
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5.1 Liquidity dynamics prior to the jumps   
Hypotheses: origin of jumps 
Previous literature suggests that lagged liquidity shocks in the order book such as a widened 
spread, decreased market depth and levered number of trades indicate the occurrence of jumps 
(Boudt & Petitjean 201x; Jiang et al. 2011). Our event study setting provides a 
straightforward way to validate the above predictions. In case there are pre-jump liquidity 
shocks, we should observe the median value of some liquidity variable during the pre-jump 
periods to be significantly different from zero. We distinguish three potential relations 
between preceding liquidity in the book and the occurrence of jumps: 
H1: A price jump will occur when the liquidity in the limit order book is unusually low, and 
cannot absorb a normal market order flow. 
H2: A price jump will occur when the liquidity in the limit order book is normal, and the 
market order flow is unusually high. 
H3: A price jump will occur when a high level of liquidity triggers an even higher flow of 
market orders which cannot be absorbed by the liquidity in the limit order book. 
Results 
Prior to a positive jump, there is no significant change in the size-weighted proportional 
quoted spread (tightness). Nor do we observe any strong trend in trading activies during the 
60 minutes prior to the jump, as trading volume stays at its normal level and transactionorder 
flow is balanced (immediacy). Furthermore, the volume of outstanding limit orders (both 
overall and at the best quote) on the side that has to absorb the jump shows no universal 
pattern in the 60 minutes prior to the jump (depth and breadth). Our findings have 
implications for the predictability of jumps based on the liquidity in the book, a topic that we 
explore further (See p. 23, Predictability of jumps using probit analysis). 
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5.2 Liquidity dynamics during and after the jump 
Hypotheses: interaction during jumps 
In order to interpret our observations during and after the jump, we introduce here three types 
of participants, who follow each different order placement strategies (if any). Participants can 
at each point of time be classified according to the strategy they are following. Especially on 
this type of interbank market, the same agent can apply different strategies depending on his 
specific sitation at that time.
15
 We formulate ex ante predictions on the overall outcome of a 
dynamic order placement strategy by these heterogenous agents. 
We distinguish respectively: 
 Informed traders: Participants who act on private information on the future evolution 
of an asset, like they are introduced in Kyle (1985). On the foreign exchange market, 
their information can be based on the customer order flow (Rime 2000). Informed 
traders can be patient (and submit aggresive limit orders) or impatient (and submit 
market orders). The motivation for informed traders to be patient includes lower price 
impact.
16
 They will, however, be impatient when their information is short-lived, or, 
following Bloomfield et al. (2005), when their private valuation lies outside the range 
of the inside quotes. Both patient and impatient informed traders can be present at the 
same time on the market, because they can have heterogenous private beliefs. 
H4: The presence of patient informed traders will, upon arrival of positive (negative) 
information, lead to increased submission of limit orders at the buy (sell) side, against 
competitive quotes. 
H5: The presence of impatient informed traders will, upon arrival of positive 
(negative)  information, lead to increased submission of market buy (sell) orders. 
 Market makers: Participants who primarily provide liquidity to the market. Although 
there are no designated market makers on the interbank foreign exchange market, 
participants can be attracted by the profit market making offers. The idea that a market 
making role emerges from the trading process is also referred to as endogenous 
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 In that sense, trader identities would here not be very informative. 
16
 Evidence for the existence of patient informed traders can be found in, amongst others, Eisler et al. (2011) and 
Hautsch and Huang (2012). In these works it is shown that limit orders contain information, as they have a 
permanent price impact. 
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liquidity provision.
17
 Market makers set a spread between the best buy and best sell. 
This is the source of their revenues. When setting the spread, they take the following 
costs into account: order processing costs (representing per unit administration costs 
and fixed costs such as wages, floor space rent,…), inventory holding costs (the cost 
of holding an unwanted inventory) and adverse selection costs (a compensation for the 
risk of trading with a better informed counterparty).
18
 They will typically submit 
competitive limit orders. After a jump, which we found to be trade induced in the 
previous paragraph, the spread rises in a limit order book because the market orders 
are highly imbalanced and one side of the market gets depleted. Market makers are 
attracted by this high spread and post limit orders.
19
 This increase in supply of 
liquidity will improve the best prices, and will bring the spread back to its equilibrium 
value (eg. Goettler et al. 2005). 
 
H6: The presence of market makers will, upon arrival of information, lead to an 
increased provision of liquidity at the market. 
 
 Noise traders: Participants who do not trade based on information, but trade based on 
their liquidity needs. Their part of the flow is balanced over time. We do not observe 
noise traders in our results, as we only measure unexpected trading flows and 
unexpected liquidity. 
Results: tightness 
As jumps appear to be trade-induced, the trading volume increases during a jump interval. 
The higher number of transactions consumes the liquidity available in the market, and the 
spread will consequencly in a mechanical way go up. Moreover, liquidity providers tend to 
place limit order further away from the midquote, to avoid being picked off due to the 
increased price risk. However, the widening of the spread in combination with the paucity of 
liquidity at one side of book makes it more rewarding to provide liquidity. Discretionary 
liquidity providers see which side of book requires liquidity and will submit more limit orders 
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 For a recent work dealing with the behaviour of endogenous liquidity providers in comparison to designated 
market makers, see Anand and Venkataraman (2013). 
18
 For an analysis of the importance of these components on this market, see Frömmel and Van Gysegem (2012). 
19
 As a consequence of this increased liquidity provision, the market enters then again a phase of high liquidity 
(which will afterwards again be taken away). This sequence of high liquidity – low liquidity is also referred to as 
a liquidity cycle (See e.g. Foucault et al. 2013) . 
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to this side. These limit orders are designed to benefit from the increased demand for 
immediacy.  
This is also what we observe. During the jump, the spread increases with 25.09%. We see that 
liquidity providers are attracted by this spread, and bring it back to its normal level 20 minutes 
after the jump (H6). The spread returns slightly quicker to its normal level after negative 
jumps. 
Results: immediacy 
Previous theoretical work predicts that order submissions tend to be clustered over time 
(amongst others, Kyle 1985; Admati & Pfleiderer 1988; Wang 1994). These findings were 
empirically confirmed by amongst others Campbell et al. (1993) and Covrig and Ng (2004). 
One could expect that by consequence an increase in volume traded will persist for some time 
after the jump. However, as spreads remain high after a jump, transactions are more costly. 
This high spread will impact traders submitting less aggressive limit orders.  
During a jump, market order submissions in the direction of the information increase 
drastically. As a result, the order flow gets more asymmetrical (with an increase of the 
imbalance with 57.89% towards more buy orders), and the trading volume increases by 180%. 
(H2, H5)  
The increased trading activity continues up till 20 minutes after the jump, but there is no sign 
of order flow imbalance ex post positive jumps. Thus, it seems like the increased trading after 
the jump is more balanced. The increase in trading activity is smaller after negative jumps, 
and the activity also returns faster to its normal level. 
Results: depth and breadth 
Mechanically, one would expect that the depth and breadth become unusually low at one side 
of the book during a jump, because informed traders are using the liquidity in one side of the 
book. Within the framework of a dynamic limit order market, like it was developed by 
Foucault (1999) and Foucault et al. (2005), the increase of price risk caused by increased 
volatility is due to an increase in the information asymmetry across traders. Consequently, we 
expect an increase in the placement of limit orders relative to market orders (and thus an 
increase in depth) immediately after the jump. Patient traders would then make the book 
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thicker at the opposite side. At the same time, the liquidity provision by market makers could 
restore the liquidity after the jump. 
This is also what we see in the data. At the ask side we find that the depth decreases with 
23.04%, due to the increased arrival of one-sided market orders (H5). At the same time, the 
total depth at the buy side is found to be 10.76% higher than expected. The liquidity at the 
best buy (breadth) is 14.82% higher than expected. This confirms the presence of patient 
informed traders (H4).
20
 The breadth at the ask side is unusually high during the jump (8.07% 
higher), which is consistent with the prediction that market makers become active and start 
providing liquidity (H6). 
Results resiliency 
Using evidence from experimental asset markets, it was shown that a market making role 
emerges endogenously on a financial market (Bloomfield et al. 2005). This is in line with 
empirical evidence by Ahn et al. (2001), who highlight the importance of distinguishing 
between increased volatility arising from the bid side or from the ask side. Attracted by the 
increasing reward, traders will start to submit limit orders (and thus provide liquidity) at the 
side where liquidity is needed the most. 
We do find in our results that the liquidity is restored after a jump, consistent with the 
emergence of market makers who add liquidity to the book. We see that the overall volume of 
limit sell orders entered after a positive jump is 127.27% higher than expected (See Table 
11).
21
 This is only partly the result of a quote updating process (as the cancellations at this side 
are only 86.87% higher than expected, unreported). While during the jump interval, the 
increased activity of patient informed traders dominates over the increase in limit orders 
posted by market makers, this reverts in the interval immediately after the jump. After the 
jump, market makers continue to provide unusually high liquidity up till 30 minutes after the 
jump. They bring the spread back to its normal level, and also restore the depth (from 20 
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 For negative jumps, these patient informed traders seem to be active already before the jump. They post limit 
orders at the ask side in the 60 minutes before the jump and make the book unusually imbalanced. Their impact 
on the book is also bigger (respectively 22.46% and 24.11% more liquidity during and immediately after the 
jump compared to 10.76% and 16.50% after positive jumps). 
21
 Later in this paper, we provide further evidence on order submission strategies (See p. 25, Post-jump order 
submission strategy). 
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minutes after the jump onwards).
22
 Our findings illustrate the effectiveness of endogenous 
liquidity providers, even in a relative illiquid market and after a large price discontinuity. 
Results: asymmetries between public and private news induced jumps 
We find that for most liquidity dimensions, the dynamics of liquidity are very similar for 
jumps that are caused by public news announcements, and jumps for which this is not the 
case. A reason for this surprising symmetry could be that they are both linked with 
information, like we have argued above, and that they are in this sense also more similar than 
what one would expect. This hypothesis is supported by the price reversal pattern (See Figure 
4). 
We find however one interesting and strong asymmetry in tightness: for jumps that can be 
linked with public news, the spread rises with 49.90% during a positive jump interval and 
35.15% during a negative jump interval. For jumps that cannot be linked with public news, 
the spread rises only with respectively 18.52% and 17.75%. This may seem counterintuitive at 
first sight, because public information is symmetric and private information is not. We think 
this can be explained by the behavior of the liquidity providers, who are more reluctant to 
provide liquidity when a jump is caused by a public news announcement. It might be that they 
want to wait till consensus is reached on the interpretation of the news, and that they hesitate 
to provide liquidity when they know for sure that the movements are caused by information 
(even when this information is public). We find support for this in the price reversal pattern: 
the initial jump at both sides is reverted after public news announcements, while this is only to 
a much lesser extent the case for jumps that are not linked with a public news announcement. 
This also points at an insufficient liquidity provision in an early stage after the jump.  
 
6. Further Analysis  
The prior section provides a comprehensive view on how market liquidity evolves around the 
jump. However, several important issues remain unsolved: Is it possible to forecast the jump 
occurrence using information available prior to the jump? Does the speed of price discovery 
remain unchanged after the jump? What kind of order placement strategy do traders adopt 
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 After positive jumps, the depth an breadth become even unusually high till 40 minutes after the jump. This 
overshooting cannot be found back after negative jumps. 
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after experiencing the extreme price risk due to jumps? In this section we provide further 
evidence on these issues.  
6.1 Predictability of jumps using probit analysis  
Despite the fact that there are very weak, if any, pre-jump liquidity patterns in the event study 
section, it is still possible that a certain dimension of the liquidity shocks is indicative of 
subsequent jumps or liquidity shocks jointly contribute to the occurrence of jumps. Therefore, 
we further assess the predictive power of liquidity shocks of multiple dimensions prior to the 
jump via a probit model.
23
 Our explanatory variables are selected in an attempt to cover all 
dimensions of liquidity and are in line with Boudt and Petitjean (201x). To avoid the 
contagion effect from consecutive jumps, we focus only on sample days with a single intraday 
jump. We estimate the jump probability with the following model specification:  
 (         )   (
                                          
                 
) [6.1] 
where  (         ) denotes the probability that a jump occurs conditional on a set of 
explanatory variables,   . In equation [6.1], the set of explanatory variables includes lagged 
values of spread (     ), trading volume (      ), absolute order flow imbalance (    ), 
mean depth at the best price (  ) and absolute depth imbalance (    ) at the best price. In 
addition, a contemporaneous informational dummy (    ) is also added to control for the 
possible announcement effect. All the liquidity variables used in [6.1] can be inferred from 
the Reuters screen, which is available to all market participants.  
The estimation results are reported in Table 9. Consistent with our findings in the event study 
section, conventional liquidity measures offer weak, if any, predictive power in forecasting 
the occurrence of jumps after controlling the effect of informational shocks. First, none of the 
liquidity variables in equation [6.1] are statistically significant. Second, the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients of all liquidity variables are jointly zero is not rejected at the 10% 
significance level.  
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 Our results remain unchanged when we use a logit regression. These results are available upon request. 
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6.2 Post-jump price discovery 
In this subsection, we further examine the price discovery process after a jump in the FX 
market. Prior evidence suggest that the informational role of transaction order flow weakens 
subsequent to price jumps in the US bond and equity market (Boudt & Petitjean 201x; Jiang 
et al. 2011). We extend the work on post-jump price discovery to the FX market by 
examining all the single-jump days and non-jump days via the following model: 
                                                 [6.2] 
where      denotes 100 times the change of the logarithmic mid-quote during the 10-minute 
interval t+1,     (     ) is the signed volume of transaction order flow over the interval t 
(t+1) measured in millions of euros.       is the post-jump dummy, which takes the value of 
one for the six 10-minute intervals immediately after the jump and zero otherwise. We differ 
from previous studies such as Jiang et al. (2011) by including the lagged order flow (   ) in 
the model specification to account for the possible price reversal in the next period as 
suggested by Pástor and Stambaugh (2003). That is, we expect that both the lagged and 
current order flow would impact price discovery process, but in the opposite direction. 
Therefore, the coefficient    captures the liquidity effect of lagged order flow,    captures the 
normal price impact of order flow, and    captures the additional price impact of 
contemporaneous order flow immediately after the jump, which is robust to subsequent price 
reversals.  
The results of the regression are presented in Table 10. The coefficient on contemporaneous 
order flow is significantly positive, confirming the role of order flow in the price discovery 
process (see Evans & Lyons 2002). As expected, the coefficient on the lagged order flow is 
significantly negative but much less in magnitude than that on the current order flow, 
suggesting the existence of subsequent price reversal due to illiquidity. Finally, the coefficient 
on the interaction term between the post-jump dummy and the current order flow is 
significantly negative at the 5% level. This is consistent with prior literature that the 
informational role of post-jump order flow is less pronounced than during normal trading 
periods.  
While we confirm the stylized fact regarding post-jump price discovery,  it remains 
interesting to investigate why order flow becomes less informative immediately after jumps. 
Jiang et al. (2011) attribute it to the possibly lowered dispersion of investor belief 
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immediately following the occurrence of jumps. Motivated by our findings in the event study, 
we, however, perceive it differently: The reduced informational role of (transaction) order 
flow may as well be explained by the altered order submission strategy immediately after the 
price jump, which we investigate in the next subsection. 
 
6.3 Post-jump order submission strategy 
In this subsection, we investigate in depth the impact of jumps on the subsequent order 
placement strategy using regression analysis. Prior studies suggest that a higher proportion of 
limit orders relative to market orders emerges immediately after enlarged asset volatility or a 
widened spread (Biais et al. 1995; Griffiths et al. 2000; Ahn et al. 2001; Cao et al. 2008). 
Motivated by our findings in the event study section, we extend the order placement literature 
by focusing on the impact of intraday jumps, rather than volatility, on the subsequent order-
flow composition. In particular, we estimate whether the occurrence of jumps leads investors 
to submit more limit orders relative to market orders, or the other way around.  
To address these questions, we use the change of market depth available at the best price from 
interval t to t+1 (         ) as a proxy of the order-flow composition. As it is argued by 
Ahn et al. (2001),           captures the difference between the net volume of newly placed 
limit orders and the volume of market orders executed during the time interval t+1. Therefore, 
we estimate the following empirical model which is similar to Equation 6 in Ahn et al. 
(2001). 
      
   
                                             ∑                             
[6.3] 
where           (       ) is the change of mean depth available at the best price from 
interval t (t-1) to t+1 (t),       is the post-jump dummy, which takes the value of one for the 
six 10-minute intervals immediately after the jump and zero otherwise,       is the volatility 
risk during the interval t,            is an intraday dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if interval t+1 belongs to the time interval k and zero otherwise, and      is the error 
term. Apparently, the coefficient    measures the autocorrelation pattern of the change of 
market depth, while    controls for the typical intraday variation in liquidity variables (“time 
of day” effect). The coefficient    measures the effect of increased volatility on the 
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subsequent order-flow mix and    captures the additional post-jump impact on order-flow 
composition, which is of our interest.  
The result of the regression is presented in Table 12. For the purpose of brevity, we only report 
the coefficients on the lagged changes of market depth, lagged volatility risk, the post-jump 
dummy and the interaction term. Consistent with prior literature (see Ahn et al. 2001, among 
others), the coefficient on the lagged change of mean depth is significantly negative, 
supporting the self-adjusting mechanism of the order flow. That is, there will be an influx of 
more limit orders than market orders when limit orders were relatively scarce in the prior 
period, which is consistent with the conventional wisdom that market depth tends to get 
replenished to its normal shape (resiliency). Similar to the results reported in Table III of Ahn 
et al. (2001), there is no strong evidence that increased transitory volatility would lead 
investors to submit more limit orders than market orders as    is insignificantly different from 
zero (the sign of the coefficient is in fact slightly negative).
24
 Finally, the coefficient estimate 
on the interaction term between post-jump dummy and lagged volatility risk remains strongly 
positive at the 5% level, confirming our expectation that investors prefer to submit more limit 
orders instead of market orders subsequent to the occurrence of jumps. It should be noted that 
two forces contribute to the increased use of limit orders after a jump. On the one hand, the 
sudden increase of transitory volatility due to jumps makes it attractive for participants to 
adopt market making strategies, as the expected gain of supplying liquidity outweighs the 
expected loss of trading against an informed trader and holding an unwanted inventory for a 
short time span. On the other hand, even informed traders will opt for limit orders instead of 
market orders, because the cost of submitting a market order increases dramatically due to the 
rise in transitory volatility associated with the jump. As we do not have the identity of the 
traders, we cannot distinguish between these two forces.  
Overall, our evidence on traders’ post-jump order submission strategy is consistent with the 
results in the event study section: the “make or take” decision is altered following price jumps 
as more liquidity (depth) is built up in the book with newly submitted limit orders. The reason 
for a weakened post-jump price discovery process become clear: transaction order flow 
become less informative with a thick order book.  
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 One possible explanation for the insignificance of    is that the relation between transitory volatility and the 
change of market depth does not need to be monotonically increasing, nor linear. In an unreported regression we 
find that the coefficient on the quadratic risk is highly significant and positive, indicating the relation might not 
be linear. 
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7. Conclusion 
Using a unique dataset (including the complete limit order book) over a two year timespan, 
we investigated the relation between intraday jumps, news announcements and liquidity 
dynamics in the HUF/EUR interdealer market.  
First, our results conform to the general finding that jumps are frequent on financial markets. 
In a relatively illiquid FX market, such as our HUF/EUR market, we find that around 18.2% 
of the sample days contain at least one intraday jump with the jump component contributing 
to nearly one-half of the realized volatility during the jump day.  
Secondly, we investigate the relation between jumps and news releases of various sorts. In 
particular, we employ a much broader dataset of news announcements which includes not 
only scheduled news releases, but also unscheduled news announcements such as polls, 
surveys, forecasts and analyses on future fundamentals. We find that scheduled news explains 
16% of the jumps, while unscheduled news explains 30.4% of the jumps, confirming that both 
news on fundamentals (scheduled news), and news which will change the market expectations 
on future fundamentals (unscheduled news) are both important sources of large exchange rate 
movements. Still nearly half of the jumps remain unexplained by (public) news 
announcements. However, we show that jumps are information-based, independent whether 
they are linked with public news or not, as they have a similarly large permanent price impact 
and are both accompanied by highly imbalanced order flows. 
Thirdly, we test the predictions from limit order book models under extreme market 
conditions by zooming in on the various dimensions of liquidity dynamics around jumps. 
Using an event-study approach, we find that prior to jumps the liquidity pattern does not 
deviate from that in normal trading periods. During the jump period, our results suggest that 
jumps do not emerge because of unusually low liquidity supply, but because of an unusually 
high demand for immediacy concentrated on one side of the order book. Moreover, a dynamic 
order placement process emerges after the jump: More limit sell (buy) orders are added to the 
book subsequent to a positive (negative) jump, which is consistent with the presence of 
endogeneous liquidity providers on the market. Attracted by the higher reward for providing 
liquidity, they submit limit orders at the side where it is needed the most. In addition, we 
detect a high level of resilience in the market, but this resilience is on average more 
pronounced for negative jumps than for positive jumps. Another interesting asymmetry is that 
the liquidity providers tend to be more reluctant to add liquidity when confronted with a news 
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announcement around the jump. By consequence the spreads increase more dramatically in 
cases of jumps with news announcements than that of jumps without news events.  
Finally, our further analyses offer more insights. First, the probit analysis shows that none of 
the liquidity variables offer predictive power for jump occurrence, which is consistent with 
the normal liquidity pattern prior to jumps documented in the event study section.  Second, we 
find that post-jump order flow is in general less informative than in normal trading periods. 
This is in line with the additional evidence from the third analysis on order submission 
strategy: more limit orders relative to market orders are submitted to the book after the jump. 
Therefore, the informational role of order flow becomes less pronounced in the thick order 
book after the jump.  
One direction for future research is to investigate the liquidity dynamics around jumps under 
different market microstructures (e.g. market with designated market makers, the customer 
FX market). This would be highly relevant for the purpose of optimal market design.  
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Tables 
 
2003 
Jan-Jun 
2003 
Jul-Dec 
2004 
Jan-Jun 
2004 
Jul-Dec 
Number of orders 89339 94151 114891 115416 
Market orders (%)     
Buy side 8.12% 7.96% 7.52% 7.96% 
Ask side 7.58% 7.58% 7.55% 7.97% 
Limit orders 
(not exec., %) 
    
Buy side 29.92% 30.16% 31.23% 28.37% 
Ask side 27.09% 27.95% 28.21% 26.11% 
Limit orders 
(at least partly exec., %) 
    
Buy side 13.27% 12.96% 12.81% 14.71% 
Ask side 14.01% 13.40% 12.67% 14.88% 
Size     
Small size (1 Mill., %) 71.16% 76.03% 78.25% 75.99% 
Medium size (2 Mill., %) 16.52% 14.38% 13.46% 14.24% 
Large (+2 Mill., %) 12.32% 9.59% 8.29% 9.77% 
Table 1: Order descriptives. 
 
2003 
Jan-Jun 
2003 
Jul-Dec 
2004 
Jan-Jun 
2004 
Jul-Dec 
Average spread 
(HUF/EUR) 
0.31 0.39 0.35 0.24 
Average breadth     
Buy side 1.97 1.73 1.66 2.06 
Ask side 1.84 1.67 1.54 1.63 
Average depth     
Buy side 12.89 28.36 11.96 43.52 
Ask side 11.38 9.67 9.70 12.66 
Average number of levels     
Buy side 6.22 6.12 6.02 6.99 
Ask side 5.64 5.27 5.83 7.35 
Table 2: Book descriptives. 
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Panel A: Descriptives of the price process 
 Realized 
Volatility 
All 
Continuous 
Components 
All Jump 
Components 
Significant 
Jump 
Components 
Observations 494 494 494 90 
Mean (*10
-3
) 0.33 0.30 0.03 0.17 
Median (*10
-3
) 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.06 
Standard Deviation (*10
-3
) 1.40 1.39 0.16 0.35 
Minimum (*10
-3
) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Maximum (*10
-3
) 28.30 28.30 2.07 2.07 
Skewness 17.02 17.37 8.61 3.57 
Kurtosis 329.76 339.07 87.36 16.27 
Table 3: Prevalence and size of jumps. 
 
 
 
Positive Jumps Negative Jumps 
Observations 65 60 
Number of Jump 
Days 56 52 
 
Size Variance  Size Variance 
Mean (*10
-3
) 3.08 0.016 -2.54 0.010 
Median (*10
-3
) 2.23 0.005 -1.97 0.004 
Standard 
Deviation (*10
-3
)  2.50 0. 030 0.184 0.016 
Minimum (*10
-3
) 0.59 0 -8.95 0 
Maximum (*10
-3
) 14.42 0.208 -0.61 0.080 
Skewness 2.08 4.59 -1.73 3.04 
Kurtosis 5.90 26.39 3.15 9.78 
Table 4: Positive vs. negative jumps. 
 
 
 
Panel B: Jump characteristics 
 Mean Min. Med. Max. 
Standard 
Deviation 
Jump duration 
(in days) 
6.6 1.0 6.0 28.0 5.5 
Contribution to volatility  
(on jump day) 
42.59% 11.52% 38.67% 94.08% 22.27% 
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 Time of 
Announcement 
Number of 
Observations 
Number of 
observations 
that match 
jumps 
P(Jump|News) P(News|Jump) 
All categories   20 < 1% 16.00% 
News on 
Hungary      
GDP 9 am 8 2 25.00% 1.60% 
Public Sector 
Balance 10 am/ 5 pm 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
Current Account 
Balance 8:30 am 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
Retail Sales 9:00 am 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
News on 
Germany      
CPI 8 am 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
Wholesale Price 8 am 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
Import Price 8 am 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
News on the 
United States      
PPI 2:30 pm 24 2 8.33% 1.60% 
CPI 2:30 pm 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
Real GDP 2:30 pm 8 1 12.50% 0.80% 
Tradebalance 2:30 pm 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
Consumer 
Confidence 4 pm 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
New Home Sales 4 pm 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
Construction 
Spending 4 pm 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
ISM Index 4 pm 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
News on 
CEEC’s: Poland      
PPI 4 pm 24 2 8.33% 1.60% 
Industrial Output 4 pm 24 1 4.17% 0.80% 
Table 5: Jumps and scheduled macroeconomic announcements. 
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 Explained by News 
Explained by Scheduled 
Announcements 
Explained by 
Unscheduled, Real-Time 
News 
All jumps 58 (46.40%) 20 (16.00%) 38 (30.40%) 
Ranked by size of 
the Jump 
   
Top 15 8 (53.30%) 4 (26.70%) 4 (26.70%) 
Top 16 to 30 7 (46.70%) 2 (13.33%) 5 (33.33%) 
Top 31 to 50 11 (55.00%) 4 (20.00%) 7 (35.00%) 
Rest of the Jumps 32 (42.70%) 10 (13.33%) 22 (29.33%) 
Table 6: Share of jumps explained by news announcements. 
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  -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 
Tightness 
      
  
      
SWPQS -5,25% -4,36% 1,31% 0,60% -4,72% -1,56% 25,09% 18,03% -3,00% -3,06% 6,95% 6,14% 8,76% 
Immediacy 
      
  
      
VOL 16,67% -4,35% 0,00% 0,00% -11,27% 0,00% 180,00% 87,50% 25,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
OI 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 57,89% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Depth 
      
  
      
DPTHB 0,12% -0,63% -4,47% 5,11% -3,54% -5,46% 10,76% 16,50% 5,75% 1,41% 0,11% -3,11% -6,27% 
DPTHA -9,55% -3,77% -8,74% -3,72% 0,14% -6,94% -23,04% -12,91% 19,01% 18,85% 16,99% 19,15% 4,74% 
DI -3,52% -2,62% 0,94% -4,16% 0,30% 0,14% -15,81% -8,52% 0,44% 6,93% 9,15% 6,73% 3,15% 
Breadth         
  
  
  
        
BRDTHB 5,59% -1,63% -3,45% 0,62% 2,74% 2,33% 14,82% 1,28% -0,36% 3,18% 2,71% 7,67% -1,49% 
BRDTHA -2,39% 12,23% -1,70% -0,82% 2,22% -4,57% 8,07% 8,76% 11,82% 8,76% 8,79% 0,93% 7,07% 
BI 0,00% 7,00% 1,22% 0,00% -4,23% -0,98% -4,50% 5,76% 3,01% 0,00% 0,00% -3,28% 0,00% 
 
Table 7: Liquidity dynamics around positive jumps (Light gray: significant at 10% level, medium gray: significant at 5% level, dark gray: significant at 1% level).* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* SWPQS: Size-weighted proportional quoted spread, VOL: Volume traded, OI: Order flow imbalance, DPTHB: Mean depth at the bid side, DPTHA: Mean depth at the ask 
side, DI: Mean depth imbalance, BRDTHB: Mean depth at the best bid, BRDTHA: Mean depth at the best ask, BI: Mean imbalance of depth at the best quotes. 
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  -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 
Tightness 
      
  
      
SWPQS 1,69% 3,89% 2,79% 7,74% -0,83% -0,90% 23,88% 6,02% 2,24% 8,71% 6,77% -3,75% 7,94% 
Immediacy 
      
  
      
VOL 0,00% 0,00% 42,86% 6,67% 0,00% 0,00% 125,00% 50,00% 0,00% 18,92% 0,00% 20,00% 0,00% 
OI 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% -33,33% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Depth 
      
  
      
DPTHB -10,65% -12,63% -16,24% -11,08% -4,30% -11,83% -37,07% -18,77% -12,69% 3,33% -4,98% -15,35% -2,97% 
DPTHA 18,30% 16,36% 20,77% 25,60% 27,18% 7,56% 22,46% 24,11% 19,30% -0,07% 11,40% 4,91% 2,49% 
DI 10,56% 8,93% 14,83% 16,30% 10,15% 5,27% 20,08% 19,02% 14,84% 9,69% 4,93% 10,07% 2,31% 
Breadth                           
BRDTHB -2,70% -5,92% 3,76% 1,25% -6,65% 2,14% 9,59% -0,63% 0,00% 4,26% -0,02% 0,00% 1,46% 
BRDTHA 18,48% 17,19% 22,57% -1,57% 6,60% -5,71% 13,98% 2,54% -3,53% -4,64% -1,88% -3,46% 3,69% 
BI 2,03% 7,69% 0,00% 1,21% 9,58% -1,59% -1,04% 5,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
 
Table 8: Liquidity dynamics around negative jumps (Light gray: significant at 10% level, medium gray: significant at 5% level, dark gray: significant at 1% level).* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* SWPQS: Size-weighted proportional quoted spread, VOL: Volume traded, OI: Order flow imbalance, DPTHB: Mean depth at the bid side, DPTHA: Mean depth at the ask 
side, DI: Mean depth imbalance, BRDTHB: Mean depth at the best bid, BRDTHA: Mean depth at the best ask, BI: Mean imbalance of depth at the best quotes. 
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Α β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 γ Adj. R
2 
L 
Joint 
test 
Specification 1      
Coeff. -1.953 -18.319 -0.013 -0.300 -0.067 -0.576 2.028 6.70% -288.11 7.45 
NW s.e. 0.093 20.138 0.033 0.220 0.163 0.441 0.316    
Test stat. -21.090 -0.910 -0.410 -1.360 -0.410 -1.310 6.42    
p-value 0.000 0.363 0.685 0.172 0.683 0.192 0.000   0.19 
Table 9: Probit regression of jump probability. 
 
 
 α0 α1 β0 β1 β2 Adj. R
2 
Specification 1     
Coeff. -0.000 -0.006  0.008 -0.003 22.19% 
NW s.e. 0.000 0.004  0.001 0.001  
Test stat. -0.640 -1.470  9.730 -2.500  
p-value 0.525 0.142  0.000 0.012  
Specification 2     
Coeff. -0.000 -0.006 -0.001 0.008 -0.003 22.70% 
NW s.e. 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.001  
Test stat. -0.530 -1.370 -3.650 9.790 -2.380  
p-value 0.597 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.018  
Table 10: Regression of price change on order flow. 
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Resiliency after positive jumps 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 
LOB 188,89% 112,89% 26,87% 14,64% 0,00% -22,22% -23,02% 
LOS 127,27% 220,00% 42,86% 70,73% 14,29% 22,61% 0,00% 
LOI 13,58% -8,33% -0,37% -5,26% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
LOBB 233,33% 100,00% 0,00% -11,11% 0,00% 0,00% -25,00% 
LOSB 108,33% 185,71% 33,33% 13,95% 1,96% 1,96% -16,67% 
LOIB 14,29% -11,58% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Resiliency after negative jumps 
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 
LOB 126,67% 122,22% 25,00% -12,50% 0,00% 40,63% 11,24% 
LOS 220,00% 82,11% -18,37% 23,60% 23,60% 33,33% 33,33% 
LOI -15,00% 6,89% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
LOBB 122,22% 80,00% 0,00% 0,00% 11,11% 12,50% 23,08% 
LOSB 250,00% 55,56% 0,00% 0,00% 20,00% 33,33% 25,00% 
LOIB -27,87% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Table 11: Resiliency after jumps (Light gray: significant at 10% level, medium gray: significant at 5% 
level, dark gray: significant at 1% level).* 
 
* LOB: Volume of limit buy orders submitted, LOS: Volume of limit sell orders submitted, LOI: Imbalance of the 
volume of limit orders submitted, LOBB: Volume of limit orders entered at the best buy, LOSB: Volume of limit 
orders entered at the best sell, LOIB: Imbalance of the limit orders entered at the best quote. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Regression of depth change on lagged transitory volatility. 
 
 
 
 
 α0 α1 β0 β1 ρ1 Adj. R
2 
Specification 1    
Coeff. -0.007  -0.083  -0.271 6.20% 
NW s.e. 0.051  0.116  0.024  
Test stat. -0.130  -0.720  -11.270  
p-value 0.895  0.475  0.000  
Specification 2    
Coeff. -0.006 -0.078 -0.139 0.988 -0.271 6.21% 
NW s.e. 0.051 0.066 0.121 0.412 0.024  
Test stat. -0.110 -1.190 -1.150 2.400 -11.270  
p-value 0.910 0.234 0.252 0.017 0.000  
38 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1: Average daily quote and total volume traded over the sample period. 
 
Figure 2: Intraday distribution of ticks (CET). 
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Figure 3: Intraday distribution of jumps. 
 
Figure 4: Price reversal after a jump. 
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Figure 5: Bid-ask spread (SWPQS) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 
 
Figure 6: Volume traded (VOL) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 
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Figure 7: Order imbalance (OI) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 
 
Figure 8: Mean bid depth at best quote (BRDTHB) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 
-100%
 -80%
 -60%
 -40%
 -20%
   0%
  20%
  40%
  60%
  80%
 100%
       -60       -50       -40       -30       -20       -10       0       +10       +20       +30       +40       +50       +60
N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P
-50%
  0%
 50%
100%
150%
       -60       -50       -40       -30       -20       -10       0       +10       +20       +30       +40       +50       +60
N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P N P
42 
 
 
Figure 9: Mean ask depth at best quote (BRDTHA) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 
 
Figure 10: Mean bid depth (DPTHB) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 
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Figure 11: Mean ask depth (DPTHA) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 
 
Figure 12: Volume of  lim. buy orders (LOB) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window. 
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Figure 13: Volume of lim. sell orders (LOS) for neg. (N)/ pos. (P) jumps during the event window.
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Appendix I: Definition of Liquidity Measures 
SWPQS The size-weighted proportional quoted spread, defined as the weighted 
average of the quoted spread per 10 minute interval. The weighting 
scheme uses the quantities available at the prevailing quotes as the 
weight.  
NT Number of trades, defined as the total number of transaction per 10 
minute interval. 
VOL Trading volume, defined as the total transaction volume by value per 
10 minute interval.  
OF (Transaction) Order flow, defined as the signed trading volume per 10 
minute interval. 
OI Order flow imbalance, defined as the ratio of transaction order flow to 
the total transaction volume by value per 10 minute interval. 
DPTHB Mean depth at the bid side, defined as the average quantity available at 
the bid side of the limit order book over all quotes per 10 minute 
interval. 
DPTHA Mean depth at the ask side, defined as the average quantity available at 
the ask side of the limit order book over all quotes per 10 minute 
interval. 
DI Depth imbalance, defined as the difference between DPTHA and 
DPTHB scaled by the sum of DPTHA and DPTHB per 10 minute 
interval. 
BRDTHB Mean breadth at the bid side, defined as the average quantity available 
at the best bid of the limit order book over all quotes per 10 minute 
interval. 
BRDTHA Mean breadth at the ask side, defined as the average quantity available 
at the best ask of the limit order book over all quotes per 10 minute 
interval. 
BI Breadth imbalance, defined as the difference between BRDTHA and 
BRDTHB scaled by the sum of BRDTHA and BRDTHB per 10 minute 
interval. 
LOB Limit buy order submitted, defined as the quantities (volume) of newly 
placed limit buy orders per 10 minute interval. 
LOS Limit sell order submitted at the best price, defined as the quantities 
(volume) of newly placed limit sell orders per 10 minute interval. 
LOI Limit order imbalance, defined as the difference between LOB and 
LOS, scaled by the sum of LOB and LOS per 10 minute interval. 
LOBB Limit buy order submitted at the best price, defined as the quantities 
(volume) of newly placed limit buy orders at the best price per 10 
minute interval. 
LOSB Limit sell order submitted at the best price, defined as the quantities 
(volume) of newly placed limit sell orders at the best price per 10 
minute interval. 
LOIB Limit order imbalance at the best price, defined as the difference 
between LOBB and LOSB, scaled by the sum of LOBB and LOSB per 10 
minute interval.  
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Appendix II: Standardization of the liquidity measures 
It is well known in the empirical literature that liquidity measures have seasonal patterns at 
the daily and intraday level whether they are compounded with news announcements or not 
(eg. see figure 1 Fleming & Remolona 1999). Therefore, liquidity measures need to be 
standardized to make them comparable across days and intraday periods. Moreover, the 
empirical distribution of liquidity measures is highly skewed to the right at the intraday level 
as pointed out by Plerou et al. (2005) among others. Motivated by the applications in Boudt 
and Petitjean (201x); Boudt et al. (2011), we favor median value rather than mean value for 
standardizing purpose, which deviates from previous literature ((Fleming & Remolona 1999; 
Jiang et al. 2011; Gomber et al. 2013). 
Following Boudt and Petitjean (201x), we assume that all the liquidity measures except 
spread and imbalance measures follow a multiplicative specification: On non-jump days, the 
intraday value of the liquidity measure ( denoted as       ) is the product of a latent daily 
factor     and a deterministic intradaily factor     and an i.i.d. error term      with median 1.  
                 (AII.1) 
On jump days, however, the above specification is augmented by an additive component      
associated with jumps: 
                      (AII.2) 
Given the above assumptions, the sample counterpart of the daily factor (  ̂ ) is proxied by 
the median value of the intraday liquidity measure on day i, while the sample intraday factor 
(  ̂ ) is estimated as the sample median of all the observed intraday liquidity values in 
interval j on non-jump days ( NJD ),  scaled by their respective daily factor. 
  ̂             
  ̂   
  ̂ 
 
 
(AII.3) 
It is thus straightforward to calculate the percentage deviation of the liquidity value from its 
normal (expected) level via the following equation. 
  ̃    
  ̂   
  ̂   ̂ 
   
 
(AII.4) 
where the first term in the RHS of the equation is the standardized liquidity measure.  
As the imbalance measures are bounded in (-1, +1), we opt for an additive process with the 
following specification: 
                        (AII.5) 
with      as an i.i.d. error term  with zero median and      as an additive component due to  
jumps. In the same token, the estimated daily factor (  ̂ ) is proxied by the median value of 
the intraday liquidity measure on day i. The sample intraday factor (   ̂  ), however, is 
estimated as the sample median of all the observed intraday liquidity values in interval j on 
non-jump days ( NJD ), net of their respective daily factor: 
  ̂             (  ̂      ̂ ) (AII.6) 
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The deviation of the liquidity value is thus: 
  ̃      ̂       ̂    ̂  (AII.7) 
Therefore, we use the above equation to estimate the deviation for liquidity measures 
including depth imbalance, order imbalance, imbalance of newly placed limit orders and 
spread.  
For either of the model specification, we would expect the median value of   ̃    to be zero in 
case of no (significant) jump effect on liquidity.  
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